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Personnel Selection (ASEP), Athens, Greece
Abstract
A long-term assessment of the EU integration process is attempted for the 1971-2015 period, by comparing per capita Gross Domestic Product (in con-
stant Purchasing Power Parities) and its change, for EU-15 and non-EU states 
that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment. A growing divergence is found between Greece but also Portugal and the 
EU southern periphery on the one hand, and Luxembourg, Ireland and Scandi-
navian states on the other that have benefi ted from EU integration, especial-
ly after the Eurozone was formed. Those EU-15 members that have joined the 
Eurozone have not benefi ted as much as non-members. It is suggested that two 
types of states can be trapped by the integration process: The relative or abso-
lute losers of the currency zone, like Greece and states like the UK that have 
benefi ted less from integration, while choosing to remain at an earlier integra-
tion stage. Given the mix of monetary and fi scal policies pursued, resolving the 
former problem will require setting-up a common production union to advance 
competitiveness and co-operation, while solution to the latter should avoid the 
risk of disintegration and of the permanent loss of EU membership. 
KEY-WORDS: Eurozone, EU, Integration, Unifi cation, Fiscal & Banking Union, 
Common Production Union. 
Μια αξιολόγηση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ολοκλήρωσης 
για την ΕΕ-15 (1971-2015)
Οικονόμου Κωνσταντίνος, Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών,
Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο & ΑΣΕΠ, Αθήνα, Ελλάδα
Περίληψη
Μ ια μακροπρόθεσμη αξιολόγηση της διαδικασίας ολοκλήρωσης της Ε.Ε. επιχειρείται για την περίοδο 1971-2005, συγκρίνοντας το κατά κεφαλή 
Ακαθάριστο Εγχώριο Προϊόν (σε σταθερές ισοτιμίες αγοραστικής δύναμης) και την 
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αλλαγή του, σε χώρες-μέλη της ΕΕ-15 και μη μέλη της ΕΕ, που αμφότερα είναι 
μέλη του Οργανισμού Οικονομικής Συνεργασίας και Ανάπτυξης. Μια αυξανόμενη 
απόκλιση εντοπίζεται της Ελλάδας καθώς και της Πορτογαλίας και της νότιας 
περιφέρειας της ΕΕ από την μια πλευρά και του Λουξεμβούργου, της Ιρλανδίας 
και των Σκανδιναβικών χωρών από την άλλη που κέρδισαν σημαντικότερα οφέλη 
από την ολοκλήρωση της ΕΕ, ειδικά μετά την δημιουργία της Ευρωζώνης. Τα μέλη 
της ΕΕ-15 που συμμετείχαν στην Ευρωζώνη δεν επωφελήθηκαν όσο τα μη μέλη. 
Προτείνονται δυο τύποι κρατών που μπορούν να παγιδευτούν μέσα στη διαδικασία 
ολοκλήρωσης: Οι σχετικοί ή απόλυτοι «χαμένοι» της νομισματικής ζώνης, σαν την 
Ελλάδα, και κράτη σαν το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο που επωφελήθηκε λιγότερο από την 
οικονομική ολοκλήρωση, επιλέγοντας να παραμείνει σε ένα πιο πρώιμο στάδιο 
της. Δεδομένου του επιδιωκόμενου μείγματος νομισματικής και δημοσιονομικής 
πολιτικής, η επίλυση του πρώτου προβλήματος θα απαιτήσει τη δημιουργία 
μιας Κοινής Ένωσης για την Παραγωγή που να προωθήσει περισσότερο την 
ανταγωνιστικότητα, την συνεργασία και άμιλλα στην Ευρωζώνη ενώ η επίλυση 
του δεύτερου θα πρέπει να αποφύγει το ρίσκο της μόνιμης απώλειας της ιδιότητας 
του μέλους της ΕΕ και της από-ολοκλήρωσης.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Ευρωζώνη, Ε.Ε., Ολοκλήρωση, Ενοποίηση, Δημοσιονομική 
και Νομισματική Ένωση, Κοινή Ένωση για την Παραγωγή.
1. Introduction
T he vision of a united Europe has never been promoted in the history of Europe before as much as during the last decades. However, the recent 
“Brexit”, the fi rst serious disintegration step at the EU, has exposed the stability, 
legitimacy and acceptance of the EU edifi ce, at least for citizens in one of its 
former constituent members, the UK.
The present work assesses the long-term results of the European integration 
process upon EU member-states, focusing on those states that have historically 
joined earlier the common integration effort, and in particular before the 2005 
EU enlargement. These states have taken the decision to form the common 
monetary zone and have taken the decisive steps to set up the Eurozone in 2001. 
After discussing few points concerning “Brexit”, the potential, much 
discussed at the beginning of the Greek crisis “Grexit”, and the EU response 
to Eurozone’s crisis, a macroeconomic analysis is provided that emphasizes the 
necessity to apply common supply-side policies in states that were given limited 
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room for manoeuvre beyond the decisions taken for common monetary and fi scal 
policy, and which had not managed to recover from the crisis or gain signifi cant 
benefi ts out of the integration process so far. Then, evidence is provided on the 
results of the long-term integration process at a period extending from 1971 to 
2015, using GDP per head (measured in constant purchasing power parities) 
for all EU states, members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) that have joined the EU before the 2005 enlargement. 
These are compared with each other and with other OECD states. 
The results emphasize the growing gap and divergence in GDP per head 
terms between some outliers of the European integration process and some 
losers. The discussion that follows focuses on resolving the problem in Greece, 
Eurozone and the EU Southern periphery, refers to the UK and its position 
before exiting the EU that made it hard to decide whether to leave the EU, and 
raises few points necessary for better processing and organizing the integration 
path taken at the EU. 
2. The crisis at the Eurozone, its resulting policy adjust-
ment and some points concerning Brexit and Grexit
T he EU is now composed of a common currency zone, its most integrated part, joined by most of its member-states, the European Single Market shared by 
all its members, including three out of four EFTA states (Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein), forming together the European Economic Area, and the Customs 
Union, now shared by all EU member-states, three small-in-size non-members 
-namely San Marino, Monaco and Andorra- and Turkey. EU members-states 
have chosen to leave behind their differences and collaborate in deepening 
their economic integration. However, several states had decided not to join the 
common currency, keeping their autonomy and preserving their rights to follow 
individual development paths. 
The EU is as an economic union or block that has been formed to help and 
promote the economies and economic interests of its member-states. Economic 
development, welfare and the rise of standards of living is the key rationale behind 
economic integration. Many theorists in early integration studies had proclaimed 
that welfare will rise in the transition from a Free Trade Area to Customs Union 
and then to Common Market, both for consumers and producers. The early stages 
of European integration were associated with the development of international 
trade and its promotion that was expected to act as a major growth driver. As the 
European states have moved further in their integration, they have decided to 
share the common currency and start an economic union as well. 
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However, recently they have realized that a monetary union alone is not the 
only precondition to resolve economic problems and bring growth and stability. 
This realisation came only after signifi cant events took place in chain: the 2009 
global crisis, the speculation against the common currency, the fl ying away of 
fi nancial and human capital from crisis-hit countries, most notably Greece, the 
rise of a strong sentiment of euroscepticism in dissatisfi ed European societies 
and the recent democratic choice of “Brexit”. 
The 2009 crisis was essentially a debt and BOP crisis. As debtor countries 
were unable to borrow funds, creditor countries had soon realized the necessity 
to lend them and implement bail-out programmes to avoid the collapse of 
Eurozone (Frieden and Walters, 2017). If each state had its own currency, defi cit 
countries could have tackled a strong BOP imbalance through exchange-rate 
devaluation as an external adjustment, combined with structural reforms and 
austerity as internal adjustments. On the other hand, surplus countries would 
have employed exchange-rate appreciation or run infl ation and promote reforms 
aiming to boost demand (see Frieden and Walters, 2017). But for member-states 
sharing a common currency, external-rate adjustment is not the best possible 
choice for all, and only an internal devaluation process in debtor countries with 
structural reforms was considered feasible, to allow reducing unit labour costs 
and raising competitiveness. This is despite the side-effects of such policy, which 
are unemployment, lower wages, asset price defl ation and recession (Frieden 
and Walters, 2017). The expectations from such a policy and its side-effects 
are that it will bring divergence of economies, at least in the short-run. Debtor 
countries can either repay debts in full, by applying restrictive domestic fi scal 
policies (through raising tax rates and cutting tax expenditures) that would face 
the cost of higher unemployment and reduced economic activity or seek debt 
restructuring, which could lead to agreements sharing the debt burden (Frieden 
and Walters, 2017).  
The adoption of the common currency without few signifi cant elements 
needed in place for the banking, fi scal and political unifi cation has caused several 
economic problems that were intensifi ed after the outburst of the recent fi nancial 
crisis. Signifi cant aspects at the monetary unifi cation stage were not given ample 
thought and consideration, such as putting earlier in place macroeconomic 
stabilizers. The absence of these aspects has revealed a considerable policy 
vacuum at the Eurozone, EU and national level, putting in motion the refl exes 
of European governance.
The 2009 crisis in Greece and its management have revealed several gaps in 
policies needed to promote the common EMU edifi ce. To fi ll in these policy gaps, 
many institutional and policy changes have taken place at the Eurozone and 
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the EU, and several EMU components were established, suggested to lead to a 
Banking, Fiscal and a Common Markets Union. Such policies have surrounded 
the operation of the monetary union, aiming to support its effi cacy and the 
capacity of Eurozone states to take the right decisions about their economies 
(Ikonomou, 2020). 
In particular fi scal policies have become tighter, because their relaxing for a 
long period was considered a major cause of the crisis in Greece, and elsewhere 
in the southern periphery. In Greece for example, the relaxing of fi scal policy 
has started since the country has joined the EC in 1981, and continued until 
the outburst of the crisis, with only few exceptions (see Ikonomou, 2018 for an 
analysis of the extended range of domestic causes of the Greek crisis). As for the 
common monetary policy, it took some time before signifi cant policy action and 
amendments take place. 
Common monetary and fi scal decisions taken by Eurozone partners were 
rather unpleasant for the Greek society, whose economic reform was requested 
to be applied through consecutive memoranda of understanding. A part of the 
Greek society was agitated at the beginning of the Greek crisis, throughout the 
negotiations held with Troika for the policy action requested and the application 
of these memoranda of understanding, opening the prospect for Greece to exit 
the Eurozone. The crisis has unveiled that there was neither an insolvency 
procedure for bankrupt states in operation nor an exit procedure for states to 
abandon the monetary union, return at an earlier integration stage or even exit 
the Union as a whole (see Ikonomou, 2018).
The almost simultaneous debates held in EU policy circles and media on 
the  prospect of Greece and the UK to exit either the Eurozone or the Union as a 
whole (even if these were not similar cases) have infl uenced the latter on its fi nal 
decision to exit the EU and the Common Market, where it participated. Based on 
the marginal democratic decision for the exit of the UK from the EU, one could 
argue that the prospect of “Grexit”, a serious problem that concerned the core of 
the most advanced integration stage reached in the EU, acted as a “sparkle” that 
brought the “fi re” of Brexit. Fiscal austerity, economic insecurity and the Euro 
fi nancial crisis after 2009 have all contributed in the rise of mistrust against 
European institutions that raised the percentage of votes for leaving the EU. 
What was an internal problem to the most integrated space (the EMU), which 
strongly related to political and fi nancial decisions about the common currency 
and the absence of an available range of policies in place, brought a historical 
choice that concerned a well-established integration stage -the Common Market- 
and affected both the most integrated and the whole common space. Although 
other reasons have infl uenced the choice to exit the EU, domestic at the UK (and 
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beyond the scope of the present analysis), one cannot neglect that such choice 
was made after a chain of events took place regarding the crisis at the Greek 
economy, and that UK citizens voting for Brexit were infl uenced by the strictness 
of solutions imposed on Greece at the time, and the management of the Greek 
crisis by its Eurozone partners. The vote for Brexit took place at a quite critical 
moment of the European integration process: at the aftermath of a global crisis 
and precisely when several views were expressed that the most advanced form 
of integration at the unifi cation edifi ce was at the verge of its collapse, due to its 
incompleteness or the lack of awareness for its completeness. One might argue 
that Brexit is a biased historical decision.
3. Few points from macroeconomic theory that contribute 
in explaining the crisis in Greece and the Eurozone 
S everal authors have raised their voice to explain the defects of the Eurozone and discuss its necessary adjustment (see for example the proliferate work by 
De Grauwe, in his consecutive publications: De Grauwe (2013); De Grauwe and 
Heens (1993); De Grauwe and Ji (2014); De Grauwe and Ji (2015); De Grauwe 
and Vanhaverbeke (1991)).  The critic has also emphasised the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, which was a major problem and primary motive behind the 
decision for setting-up a banking Union. 
From a theoretical perspective, the Keynesian IS-LM analysis reminds that 
such effectiveness in monetary policy associates not only to ECB decisions but 
also to the position, association and steepness of IS and LM curves, for each 
state (as most textbooks on macroeconomics would argue, e.g. Abel et al., 2010). 
During a crisis, money supply reduces, shifting LM to the left (see in Figure 1A). 
Applied restrictive fi scal policies, through cutting expenditure and raising taxes, 
reduce the rising pressure upon interest rates, shifting the IS curve to the left, 
and consequently limiting the aggregate demand and lowering interest rates. An 
ECB policy that raises money supply could help to lower interest rates and bring 
income at similar, initial levels (see Figures 1A and 1B). On the other hand, if 
fi scal tightening is reduced, aggregate demand shall rise. 
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Figures 1A and 1B: A simplifi ed reminder of the IS-LM framework 
at the currency zone
	     
	
   
      
       
       
     
           







     
         
          














perifereia t.10.indd   49 25/11/2020   12:21:25 µµ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:44:26 |
[50] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
Note: Description of Figures 1A and 1B
Following a crisis, the money fl ows away from weaker member-states of the currency zone, and 
the LM curve turns to the left depicted with a shift from LM1 to LM2 (Figure 1A). To cope with 
the rise of interest rates across these states (and the rise of their spreads), restrictive fi scal 
policies and tax raising is applied on them, leading to a shift of the IS curve to the left, from 
IS1 to IS2 (Figure 1A). Measures to enhance money supply will start taking place progressively 
in the currency zone, as interest rates have to remain stable and low. The rise of income -and 
consequently wealth- becomes a matter of common concern at the common currency, whose 
success relies on the effi cacy of the transmission mechanism. The fi rst increase of money 
supply, illustrated in Figure 1A by a shift from LM2 to LM3, brings interest rates back at 
initial levels, at r23 = r11, while the second increase, from LM3 to LM4, even lower, at r24, 
raising income at levels found before the application of restrictive fi scal policies. Continuing on 
this direction, the central bank can increase money supply more, raising income and lowering 
interest rates even further. Overall, shifting the LM curve from LM1 to LM5, brings back 
income at pro-crisis levels, at Y25=Y11. However, consecutive money supply increases risk 
hitting the lower-zero bound of interest rates.
Figure 1B explains that a post-crisis fall in aggregate demand (due to a shift of both IS and 
LM curves to the left), depicted with an AD shift to the left (from AD1 to AD2) can be followed by 
an increase in aggregate demand, if policies raising money supply are applied (shifting the LM 
curve to the right). Such result can also be reached by applying a common supply- side policy 
for the currency zone that causes a shift of AS curve to the right. 

































Note: Greece and Luxembourg stand in two opposite regions, the Keynesian and the classical, 
respectively. In Luxembourg, income shall rise after money supply increases. The scope of fi s-
cal expansion is limited, if meaningful at all.  In Greece, the scope of money supply increases 
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is harmful, because it pushes the economy deeper inside the liquidity trap (if LM rises from 
LM1 to LM2). On the contrary, policies aiming at fi scal expansion can move the economy out 
of the liquidity trap. Fiscal tightening (from ISc1 to ISc2) has put the economy deeper in the 
-Keynesian- liquidity trap. The two states have contradictory interests and since policies pur-
sued by ECB may harm one of them, supply-side policies should be employed along with fi scal 
and monetary policies, to resolve problems in Greece, as long as they don’t put a threat for 
the economy of Luxembourg and can be used by Luxembourg to profi t from new benefi ts and 
income revenues.  
A critical point to consider is the steepness of IS and LM curves that 
infl uences the outcome of policies. Assume the following hypothetical example 
to compare two separate states inside the common monetary space. Using an 
IS-LM analysis for a currency union, a common LM curve can be extracted, 
since money supply is created by the ECB only and money demand is the added 
sum of individual money demand schedules, for each state. Assume that at the 
individual level of the state, states have different IS curves, since some are 
wealthier than other. We can illustrate exemplary cases of separate IS curves 
and focus on two opposite cases of states, Greece and Luxembourg, with the 
latter being much wealthier than the former (Figure 2). 
After the crisis erupted, capital was transferred outside Greece as an 
immediate effect of the crisis, thereby limiting signifi cantly money supply in 
the Greek economy. Assume these funds are all transferred at Luxembourg. 
The individual levels of money supply are not the same in the two countries, 
despite the presence of a common monetary policy. In terms of the common LM 
curve, Greece is more likely to be positioned to the left and Luxembourg to the 
right (Figure 2). Hence, each state can be positioned at a specifi c LM region (a 
Keynesian, intermediate or even more advanced region), where another state 
is not. If Greece’s individual IS curve is assumed to have lied initially at the 
intermediate range before the crisis, the imposed fi scal tightening would have 
shifted anyway the economy’s IS curve towards the Keynesian range. Moreover, 
ECB policies to raise money supply (e.g. through quantitative easing), which 
may benefi t other common currency states, are expected to shift the common LM 
curve to the right, pushing the Greek economy deeper in a (Keynesian) liquidity 
trap. Getting out of this liquidity trap is impossible by means of common 
monetary or common fi scal policies, if the latter are restrictive1. 
Turning fi scal policies to less restrictive at an economy like the Greek (e.g. 
by raising government expenditure and reducing the tax burden) could infl uence 
its growth outcome, provided that money supply remains more or less fi xed. Such 
a policy is diffi cult to promote, due to the fi scal competition from other common 
currency partners, applying similar tax rates. Furthermore, raising money 
supply acts to the interest of states like Luxembourg. As Luxembourg lies at the 
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classical range, where money expansion is more effective in terms of growth and 
the effect of fi scal policies actually suspended, the prospect of limited value for 
this particular state. States lying at the intermediate region may accept adjusting 
their fi scal policy but the more they lose out of the monetary unifi cation process, 
the more unwilling will be to give up fi scal privileges and “acquis”. The risk of 
losing macroeconomic stability at the currency zone makes the problem of a single 
state that lies at the liquidity trap signifi cant for the rest of states. 
The above IS-LM analysis is used to highlight that economies participating at 
the common currency may lie in different positions, the causes of the weakening 
of one of these economies may derive from the mix of common monetary and 
fi scal policies pursued inside a currency zone and that, given the contradiction 
of interest among member-states, the common way of policies is not to pursue 
the same type of policies across all states, unless they are all located at the same 
position of the common IS-LM region. States participating in the monetary union 
require different policy mixes (fi scal, monetary or supply-side, at least for one of 
these policies). Even if a one-size-fi t approach is agreed, a special care should be 
given at least for extreme cases, because -among other reasons- they represent a 
potential threat to macroeconomic stability. Of course, such estimation is subject 
to the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism (strengthened after the place 
in motion of the Banking Union). In the case of states like Greece, whose GDP 
had signifi cantly shrunk after the crisis, the principal way to overcome this 
common currency problem, without affecting ECB’s policy to keep interest rates 
low or raise money supply is by applying common currency supply-side policies 
in Greece (or in other similar cases). 
Importantly, the above diagrams emphasize that common supply-side 
policies can become useful for the most extreme cases of less advanced states, 
and are a more secure way to allow them getting out of the liquidity trap, given 
the contradictory interests formed among states. Such an analysis is indicative 
and subject to the transmission mechanism, its effi cacy, the operation of 
international trade and the economic, fi nancial and monetary ties formed among 
the economies2. 
With this analysis in mind, it is expected that states will diverge and benefi ts 
from the common currency will not be equally shared. The analysis that follows 
investigates such a prospect.
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4. Economic development results out of the European in-
tegration (1971-2015)
I n Table 1 the levels of GDP per head are provided for the EU-15 OECD countries-members and other selected OECD member-states, measured in 
constant purchasing power parities, at the beginning of each decade (starting 
from 1971). Purchasing power parities are used because they take into account 
domestic prices and, as such, allow comparability across states that had different 
price levels, have received dissimilar pressure upon prices and have different 
standards of living. Thus, using constant purchasing power parities improves 
comparability across different infl ationary environments, inside or outside the 
EU. Per capita GDP is also provided for a fi nal year, 2015, and for the year each 
of the EU-15 states has joined the EC/EU. Each country’s change is calculated 
for the whole period after 1971 and throughout the period of its membership 
(after 1971). Average annual change is calculated for the 1971-2015 period 
and the period of membership for each EU-15 state. Changes are also provided 
for the early period of Eurozone implementation (2001-2015), its fi rst decade 
(2001-2011) and the fi rst half of the last decade (2011-2015) that coincides with 
a greatest part of the crisis in Greece and the Eurozone. The choice of the fi nal 
year allows studying the UK case, as it refers to the years of its full EC/EU 
membership before the referendum for leaving the EU. The Table comprises 
countries up to the EU-15 enlargement, since those countries joining with the 
following EU-25 enlargement had not been given suffi cient membership time to 
assess their integration results. Twenty years since the 1995 enlargement and 
another twenty-four before 1995, are a suffi cient period to assess the results of 
EU integration up to this enlargement. Historically, the year 1995 lies at the 
beginning of the replacement of a Common Market era by a Union era, when 
the second preparatory phase for the EMU has started. What is more, 12 out 
of the EU-15 members are founding members of the Eurozone, offering the 
best available period for assessing the results from their participation at this 
advanced degree of integration.
As opposed to GNI, GDP per head measures the fi nal output of goods and 
services within a country’s territory, by both residents and non-residents, 
irrespective of whether it is claimed from foreigners or domestic residents 
(Todaro and Smith, 2015). Thus, in common integrated spaces, such as the EU 
and its surrounding integrated area, where less advanced states are expected to 
suffer from greater human and capital resource fl ight towards the more advanced 
(rather than the opposite), GDP per capita can offer a better approximation for 
production differences and the minimum existing possible gaps between the 
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wealthier and less wealthy countries, in comparison to GNI per capita that 
is likely to exaggerate such gaps. Furthermore, in large and advanced states, 
where a large non-residential population is likely to play a signifi cant role 
in the economy, GDP per head can refl ect the best possible state of economic 
development in these countries than GNI per head. 
The two out of the EU-15 states mostly benefi ting from the EU integration 
process are Luxembourg and Ireland. Luxembourg has gained since 1971 almost 
$61 thousands per head (in constant PPP units), while Ireland almost $46 
thousands since 1973 (within 42 years). Using the Irish case for comparative 
purposes is diffi cult, as it amended its GDP levels during the crisis. However, the 
annual change in both states is far better than that of Germany, Netherlands or 
Belgium (almost twice for Ireland and much more in the case of Luxembourg). 
Similarly, Sweden has remarkably improved by an annual change of  $1,508, 
during the 20 years of its EU membership, almost twice that of Finland, its 
Scandinavian partner and Eurozone’s member. Sweden’s average annual change 
is much greater during its membership period than during the whole period after 
1971 ($1,508 instead of $685). This is also the case with Finland, where it is a little 
less than its double ($555 as opposed to $252). Clearly, the EU effect is high in 
these two states. The comparison to Norway, a third -but non-EU- Scandinavian 
state, whose GDP per head has reached almost $59.3 thousands in 2015, brings in 
the ranking of these three states fi rst the EU member-state, second the non-EU 
member-state and third the Eurozone state. The levels of Swedish GDP per head 
in 2015 were similar to those of the fourth Scandinavian state that has chosen to 
refrain from the Eurozone, Denmark. As if participating at the Eurozone does not 
bring the same welfare effect as choosing to refrain from it. One cannot ignore here 
a possible additional explanation that the Scandinavian welfare regime better 
contributes in improving per capita GDP distribution.
The 1995 enlargement towards the North (Sweden, Finland and Austria) is 
the most successful, if one compares the annual change of GDP per head during 
their membership and the full period studied. The fi rst decade of Eurozone 
implementation (2001-2011) and the full period of Eurozone membership (2001-
2015) are quite successful for these three states that comprise a non-Eurozone 
member. 
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Table 1: GDP per head and its change, PPP, $, periods of membership and annually (PPP), reference 
year 2010, EU-15 and other OECD states
Country, EU
joining group  













Luxembourg  - 6 28,237 33,091 55,323 77,327 85,845 89,147 60,909  60,909  (44) 1384/(1384) 11,820 3,302 8,518
Ireland           - 9 11,275 15,468 21,266 40,350 43,043 58,117 46,842  45,932  (42) 1044/(1094) 17,767 15,074 2,693
Austria         - 15 18,343 24,613 31,079 38,035 42,954 42,798 24,456  10,179  (20) 231/(509) 4,763 -156 4,919
Germany        - 6 18,975 24,580 31,722 36,619 41,462 42,522 23,547  23,547  (44) 535/(535) 5,903 1,060 4,843
Netherlands   - 6 21,923 26,249 31,945 41,423 45,117 45,419 23,496  23,496  (44) 534/(534) 3,996 302 3,694
Sweden         - 15 21,230 24,964 29,471 36,222 42,456 44,138 22,908  30,155  (20) 685/(1508) 7,916 1,682 6,234
Finland        - 15 15,779 21,742 26,345 34,778 39,626 37,973 22,194  11,094  (20) 252/(555) 3,195 -1,653 4,848
Belgium         - 6  18,885 24,778 30,418 36,575 40,544 40,977 22,092  22,091  (44) 502/(502) 4,402 433 3,969
Denmark        - 9 23,191 26,828 33,459 41,662 43,484 44,549 21,358  19 755  (42) 449/(470) 2,887 1,065 1,822
UK                  - 9 17,002 19,951 26,050 33,310 35,983 38,036 21,033  19,247  (42) 437/(458) 4,726 2,053 2,673
France           - 6 18,591 24,069 29,147 34,534 36,626 36,928 18,337  18,337  (44) 417/(417) 2,394 302 2,092
Spain            - 12 14,404 17,780 23,641 30,516 31,556 31,726 17,322  12,432  (29) 283/(429) 1,210 170 1,040
Italy                - 6 17,504 24,092 30,608 36,004 34,818 33,180 15,676  15,676  (44) 356/(356) -2,824 -1,638 -1,186
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Greece          - 10 14,912 19,369 20,622 25,262 25,665 23,656   8,744    4,287  (34) 97/(126) -1,606 -2,009 403
EU-15 17,733 22,564 28,570 34,749 37,077 37,660 19,928 - 453 2,911 583 2,328
EU-28 - - - 30,637 33,805 34,714   4,077 - 291 4,077 909 3,168
OECD - Total 16,721 21,015 26,385 32,309 35,788 37,572 20,851 - 474 5,263 1,784 3,479
Norway 22,411 32,526 40,924 54,929 57,804 59,274 36,863 - 838 4,345 1,470 2,875
Switzerland 35,577 38,787 44,031 48,004 53,295 53,860 18,283 - 416 5,856 565 5,291
Iceland 16,624 25,312 28,399 34,563 39,055 42,230 25,606 - 582 7,667 3,175 4,492
China     480     734 1,602 3,886 10,149 13,263 12,783 - 291 9,377 3,114 6,263
Costa Rica - - 7,808 9,944 13,155 14,544 6,736 - 281 4,600 1,389 3,211
USA 23,772 29,123 35,726 45,007 48,704 51,592 27,820 - 632 6,585 2,888 3,697
Japan 15,085 20,681 30,656 33,217 35,021 37,068 21,983 - 500 3,851 2,047 1,804
South Africa - - 9,572 9,811 12,043 12,182  2,610 - 109 2,371 139 2,232
Source: OECD database, GDP per head (expenditure approach), constant prices, constant PPPs, $ 2010, reference year 2010. Data 
appear in Ikonomou, 2018
Note: EU-15 states are ranked by their change for the whole 1971-2015 period. The “entry year” contains GDP per head at EU/EC entry 
year and the years of membership during the period (in parentheses), for EU states only. In “average annual change”, numbers without 
parentheses refer to the whole 1975-2015 period and numbers in parentheses to EU membership period. Missing data for EU28, Costa-
Rica & S. Africa. For South Africa, data missing for 2015 were replaced by 2014 data. Numbers close to country names refer to the group 
of countries joining the EU/EC/EEC (EEC-6, EC-9, EU-15 etc). Sweden, Denmark and the UK had not become Eurozone members at 
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Figure 4: GDP per head, Constant PPPs, $, selected OECD 
countries, 2015
Source: Table 1.
The southern EU partners on the contrary, namely Portugal, Spain, Italy 
and most notably Greece, are the four main states that have lost out of the 
integration process, in terms of annual change of GDP per head. Clearly, the 
integration of Southern Eurozone states has failed to deliver similar results with 
those towards the North. It is this contradiction with their northern partners 
that is the most worrying aspect, because the greatest amounts of funds have 
been historically transferred in southern EU, through the additional consecutive 
periods of application of EU Cohesion policy prior to the 1995 enlargement. One 
could suggest that such results reveal the lack of capacity of EU Cohesion policy 
to deliver long-term, sustainable growth in southern EU states, given their 
choice to further integrate by participating at the Eurozone. Or -even worse- 
the practical weakening of EU Cohesion Policy effects due to the application 
of common monetary policies, which appear to have harmed these Cohesion 
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A more accurate conclusion though should take into account human capital 
migration from southern to northern EU states that takes place for better job 
prospects, especially after the Eurozone was put in operation. Even if dynamic 
aspects, such as labour and human capital mobility cannot be considered in the 
present analysis, Table 2 presents the percentage change in population from 
2001 to 2015 in the EU-15 countries that it compared with the percentage change 
of their GDP per head (measured in constant PPPs, calculated from Table 1).  
Table 2: Percentage population change vs percentage GDP per 





% GDP per head 
change,
2001 - 2015  




Luxembourg 28,9% 15,3% 60909
Ireland 21,5% 44,0% 46842
Austria 7,3% 12,5% 24456
Germany 0,2% 16,1% 23547
Netherlands 5,6% 9,6% 23496
Sweden 10,2% 21,9% 22908
Finland 5,6% 9,2% 22194
Belgium 9,6% 12,0% 22092
Denmark 6,1% 6,9% 21358
United Kingdom 10,1% 14,2% 21033
France 8,5% 6,9% 18337
Spain 13,8% 4,0% 17322
Italy 6,6% -7,8% 15676
Portugal 0.0% 0,9% 15376
Greece -0,4% -6,4% 8744
EU-15 6,8% 8,4% 19928
Norway 15,0% 7,9% 36863
Switzerland 13,8% 12,2% 18283
Iceland 16,0% 22,2% 25606
Japan 0,2% 11,6% 21983
United States 12,5% 14,6% 27820
Source: Population is extracted from AMECO series. GDP per head (in Constant PPPs) is 
extracted from Table 1 (OECD database).
Note: Percentage changes are measured using as initial year 2001 (for both population and GDP 
per head). Last column reminds the ranking of GDP per head change for the full period studied.
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Few points can be suggested based on Table 2. Firstly, Luxembourg and Ire-
land, the two Eurozone member-states with the highest levels of GDP per head 
and the highest change during the study period, have also the highest levels of 
percentage population change. Secondly, the two Eurozone member-states that 
have gained less in GDP per head have also zero (in the case of Portugal) or 
negative (in the case of Greece) population change in the early period of the im-
plementation of the Eurozone (2001-2015). This Table unveils a rather inverse 
relationship between percentage population change and percentage change in 
GDP per head, for the 2001-2015 period. This point could refl ect the operation 
of a detrimental mechanism, since states with higher GDP per head levels may 
also be recipients of domestic immigration infl uxes within the Eurozone and the 
EU, along with the rise of births in their territory, and states with lower GDP 
per head levels may be migration senders (mixed with illegal migration to their 
territory from places outside the EU).   
Greece has gained only $126 annually since 1981, its joining year, at least 
ten times less than Luxembourg ($1384) or approximately Sweden ($1094). Her 
annual change compares only to South Africa’s (a state far from participating in 
advanced common integration efforts). Greece has gained only a little less than 
$1,300 (a period when Luxembourg has gained a little more than $22,000) within 
its fi rst decade of EU membership, a little less than $5,000 in the 1990s (when 
Luxembourg gained another $22,000) and has remained almost stagnant during 
the 2000s. What Greece has managed to achieve within a period of 34 years of 
membership (from 1981 to 2015) was a rise of its GDP per head by only $4287. 
In 2015 it appears to return back in GDP per head levels found before the year 
joining the Eurozone, and is a notable case of the most signifi cantly disconnected 
partner from the integration process. A marginal rise of GDP per head during 
the 1980’s and 2000’s is mixed with increases by almost $5,000 GDP per head in 
the 1970s and 1990s. Clearly, this country forms an opposite end from Luxem-
bourg (see also Figure 3). Since 1971, a divergence process takes place against 
its Eurozone partners that develop faster than Greece in GDP per head terms. 
These per head fi gures deteriorate for Greece, in the event that emigration 
of several hundreds of thousands of domestic unemployed Greeks and illegal 
immigration towards Greece are taken into account. Based on Table 2, it is 
worth underlining that not only Greece’s GDP per head has fallen for 2001 - 2015 
but also that offi cial population has shrunk during the same period. Hence, one 
could argue with certainty that Greece’s GDP was distributed at even less people 
during this period and, as such, the problem is even larger than what appears to 
be. Overall, the results for Greece based on Tables 1 and 2 indicate that not only 
there has been no convergence with the rest of EU-15 states during the years of 
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its membership but, as opposed to this, a process of divergence takes place. This 
fi nding is quite signifi cant and contradicts several of the fi ndings from regional 
economic studies that compare the Greek to the rest of the European regions, 
provided over the last two decades. Perhaps one should remember here the 
operation of Myrdal’s detrimental mechanism, still after many decades of EU 
membership and active common policies applied in Greece.
Greece and Italy are the two states mostly deteriorating ever since the 
Eurozone was placed in operation (2001-2015) (see Table 1). But while Greece’s 
population shrinks, Italy’s population rises by 6.6% (Table 2). Portugal, Spain 
and to some extent France too, appear to be the cases of states that have gained 
only but a limited rise in their GDP per head ever since the launch of the 
common currency (Table 1). Portugal is the most signifi cant case among these 
three because of its zero population change in comparison to a signifi cant rise for 
Spain (13.8%) and France (8.5%) for the 2001-2015 period (Table 2). The GDP per 
head change of Cohesion-4 states and France fell below EU-15 average, over the 
45-years period studied. This is depicted with the use of an average index MED-
5, in Figure 3. In other words, fi ve member-states that had joined quite early the 
EC, having integrated more than the rest of EU economies and chosen in 2001 to 
continue a stage further in their integration efforts, are not fi nally winning out 
of their choices, especially in the 2001-2015 period and at least in GDP per head 
terms. It appears from Table 1 that in the early period of implementation of the 
Eurozone, the Northern and Central European (EU and non-EU) states have 
benefi ted much more than the Southern Eurozone states, whereas one might 
expect the opposite to take place for the older member-states. This is emphasized 
in the 2011-2015 period, when the crisis spreads across Eurozone (again with the 
exception of Luxembourg and Ireland).    
Τhe comparison of the 1971-2015 change for the EU-15 average and 
especially EU-28 average to OECD average, Japan or USA highlights a lower 
growth change of GDP per head at the common European economy and the EU-
15 (see Figure 5). Only the two small in size states, Luxembourg and Ireland, 
perform better than USA in terms of GDP per head. The Southern Eurozone 
states have smaller change of GDP per head than Japan and, with the exception 
of France, even below that of the OECD-Total.  
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Furthermore, one can observe that the crisis has hit the Eurozone econo-
mies. From 2011 to 2015, the Eurozone states -with the notable exceptions of 
Luxembourg, Ireland and partially Germany- remained stagnant or even wit-
nessed a fall in GDP per head (Figure 6). Portugal is found to have a negative 
change and Greece only a marginal positive. The wealthier Eurozone states in 
GDP per head terms (particularly Luxembourg and Ireland) and states with 
their own currency -EU-members or not- have managed to recover in the 2011-
2015 period and to enhance their GDP per head (Table 1). Common monetary 
policy and currency independency have contributed to these results, especially 
if the cases of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the UK are taken into consider-
ation. Most EU-15 countries-members of the Eurozone had a 2011-2015 change 
well below the OECD average and far beyond that of Japan and USA (Figure 6). 
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Figure 7: GDP per head change, Constant PPP, $, selected OECD 




























































































































































perifereia t.10.indd   63 25/11/2020   12:21:25 µµ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:44:26 |
[64] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
While Ireland is not a good case to study because of the amendment of its 
GDP during the crisis (where most of its change is coming from), Luxembourg is 
clearly benefi ting after 2001 and the setting up of the common currency, along 
with Germany and Austria (Figure 7). Similarly, this is the case with Sweden 
and the UK (Figure 7). 
The three larger in size states, France, Germany and the UK, which have 
worked substantially to prepare the unifi cation process, its gradual building and 
signifi cantly contributed in funding EU Cohesion, Common Agricultural Policy 
and other common policies, are not amongst those benefi ting mostly in GDP per 
capita terms for the whole period studied (1971-2015). Notice for example the 
growing gap from 2001 to 2015, when France is compared to Sweden, in Table 1 
and Figure 7. France’s annual change for the 2011-2015 period3 has fallen well 
below its annual change for the whole period. Some of the explanations for such 
performance may be common, such as the currency policies and the rise of im-
migration and demographic pressure exercised on them. Others may differ per 
state, for instance the German unifi cation may explain Germany’s performance. 
The UK in particular, a non-Eurozone member, has gained less than the other 
EU-6 countries since 1973, in annual terms (only France gained even less). It was 
outperformed by: i) Switzerland, a European state that has chosen to refrain from 
the EU and -similarly to the UK- has focused historically to promote fi nancial servic-
es, ii) other non-EU states, such as Norway or Iceland that had managed to achieve 
better welfare results, while remaining EFTA members and enjoying the benefi ts 
of participation in the Single European market (that should have been mostly a 
privilege for the UK than for them), iii) all former EFTA members included in Table 
1 (with the exception of Portugal), members of the EU/EC or not, iv) Ireland and 
Denmark, the other two countries that have joined the EC, in the same enlargement 
with the UK and, last but not least v) most EU states, members of OECD (Eurozone 
members or not) that had benefi ted more out of the integration process. 
One could realize why the UK is the characteristic type of state considering 
exiting the EU: despite its pro-European choices, efforts and funds invested, it 
fails to compare successfully on GDP per capita terms against all other categories 
of states surrounding it. At the same time, the prospect to insert at a new stage 
of integration stage by joining the Eurozone is also of limited scope and potential 
success for the UK, because of the lack of success in Eurozone member-states, 
Eurozone’s incompleteness and its aforementioned defects, which risk harming 
even further the large UK economy. Finally, as seen in Table 2, the UK receives 
strong demographic pressure after 2001. Clearly, the UK, a relative looser in 
comparison to other northern European states that had either joined the EU or 
not, is trapped in its historical decisions and choices. 
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5. Conclusions, discussion and fi nal thoughts
The present analysis has unveiled two types of states incapable to follow even further this integration deepening process. Firstly, states like Greece that 
forms the case of a historical loser out of the unifi cation process in GDP per head 
terms (measured in constant purchasing power parities), both relative and abso-
lute. It has remained hard in this country to cross some growth and development 
barriers over the decades, despite its intense efforts to participate in all inte-
gration stages and its other sacrifi ces made. Despite what other studies might 
have acknowledged before the crisis, Greece has clearly diverged from the rest 
of economies up to 2015 and failed to benefi t as much as the rest of EU countries 
out of the integration process. The comparison to other countries from all over the 
world that had followed individual development paths may not justify much of the 
Greece’s development choice to join the European Community (EC) and partici-
pate in all consecutive integration stages. The missing aspects and components 
of the European unifi cation process had not acted in favour of Greece’s interests, 
despite the extent of common EU funds transferred to Greece via EU Cohesion 
policies that has been applied at its territory (see in Ikonomou, 2018, for a more 
complete description of the structural policies applied in Greece and the domestic 
causes of the Greek crisis). What is more Greece’s population has shrunk after the 
country has joined the Eurozone, due to human fl ight abroad, making its actual 
position even worse than it appears (Table 2). Comparative evidence from Table 
1 could be used to excuse why the prospect for a Grexit has been suggested by 
various domestic interests, political forces and Eurosceptics in Greece.  
Secondly, cases of most advanced states like the UK, whose choices and 
contribution in the past in promoting common integration and economic goals 
appear to have brought them limited benefi ts in GDP per capita terms, throughout 
the decades of its membership. These states are identifi ed by comparison to 
other European states that have refrained from such choices and any obligation 
for contribution but substantially benefi ted from the unifi cation process.  
In a Union that espouses democratic values and is still learning out of 
this unique in history, man-made, and with mistakes integration process, if 
circumstantial reasons lead a country at a certain historical period to the harsh 
-but democratically taken decision- to limit its engagement to the unifi cation 
path, then the right to disintegrate partially or fully has to be granted, by 
returning a stage back or exiting the Union respectively. This right could also act 
as an additional motive to join this Union for those states -such as former EFTA 
members- that had deliberately chosen to refrain from the unifi cation process, 
while benefi ting at the same time from economies of scale, trade expansion, 
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freedom of capital and labour, as well as numerous other economic and social 
spillovers of the EU integration process and benefi ts granted to them by the Union 
(for example the lack of imposition of same competition rules on their national 
monopolies that allow them to acquire fi rms in European states that cannot cope 
with intra-EU competition). Driven by its aim to diffuse the unifi cation ideal 
across the continent and its tolerance for individual development choices, the EU 
has never envisaged seriously the prospect to follow an easier development path, 
by imposing hard-to-cross, protectionist barriers against European states that 
had never decided to join. However, such a prospect against the “free-riders” of 
the integration is not impossible to start taking place, especially after the recent 
global upsurge of protectionist policies and the post-crisis political and social 
unrest and turmoil taking place in several European states that is possible to 
turn to some form of pan-European nationalism.
While the EU-15 as well as the EU-28 average of GDP per head was 
increasing from 2001 to 2015 (in the early period of implementation of the 
Eurozone), two countries, Greece and Italy have seen their GDP per head levels 
deteriorating, Portugal has remained stagnant, while Spain (and then France) 
had only a limited increase. The Southern periphery of the Eurozone, composed 
of Greece, Italy, Portugal and, to some extent, Spain has benefi ted less in GDP 
per head terms out of the integration process. Furthermore, it was also found 
that from all EU-15 states, the Eurozone member-states did not perform as good 
as the non-members. The presence of some detrimental mechanism is likely to 
enhance due to the ineffi cacies in the early operation of the Eurozone.
The present research has not investigated the most recent EU enlargement 
towards Central and Eastern Europe and its implications. Though it is early 
for its assessment, it is worth acknowledging that common decisions about this 
particular enlargement have not acted equally to the benefi t of existing member-
states. The economies of some member-states have signifi cantly profi ted in terms 
of trade and exploited the opportunities for their own industries that have been 
investing in Eastern economies. However, other less export-oriented economies 
suffered from the competition of low-priced, low-cost products from new member-
states that have penetrated on equal terms in European markets (in agriculture, 
food, manufacturing or other industries). Such economies have witnessed the 
removal of their own products out of the European shelves, despite the substantial 
investments from European businesses -and indirectly from EU citizens- that 
have funded common EU policies to make these products more competitive. Trade 
divergence had not been mutually benefi cial for all old EU member-states.
To overcome current problems and cope with existing challenges, the 
Eurozone member-states, aided by EU authorities, are currently building 
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various institutions, improvising new policies and organizing various, hitherto 
neglected, aspects of the unifi cation process, such as the Banking, Fiscal and 
Capital Markets Union. The  breadth and energy of this institutional and policy-
building process reminds of the period that has culminated in the formation 
of EEC; it is hard to fi nd another parallel if compared to earlier unifi cation 
periods. Such major amendments and additions to the common edifi ce should 
be based on the sound logic of economic theory. When common currency policies 
focus on the macroeconomic consensus, the most advanced states are expected 
to benefi t more from raising money supply (while disengaging from restrictive 
common fi scal policy is not useful for them), while the less advanced can profi t 
from raising expenditure and limiting restrictive fi scal policy in the short-run. 
Long-term austerity and fi scal restriction in those economies like the Greek (as 
a way to face its extended domestic borrowing) may have a limited success and 
result in harming the common economy, since the former has suffered from two 
consecutive fi nancial crises, substantial shrinking, macroeconomic imbalances 
and the entering in a (Keynesian) liquidity trap.
In such cases, organizing and promoting the application of common 
production and supply-side policies could become a valid development path to 
follow. These policies could be of common character, scope and interest (for the 
currency zone and even more broadly), possibly leading to what could be termed 
as a common production union, a common policy currently missing from the EU 
policy agenda. Instead of investing in factories and production in non-EU states, 
the Eurozone partners could decide to offer incentives for allocating suffi cient 
investments in places diverging the most, where unit labour costs have already 
improved due to the application of a variety of reforms in their labour markets; 
in places as such, high added-value products can be manufactured in existing 
or infant industries, for the common EU benefi t and use, bringing stabilizing 
effects for the common economy and turning such policy to an actual cornerstone 
for the unifi cation process.
One could listen behind the doors that had shut with Brexit, the sound of 
a bell that tolls for Europe as a whole. This fi rst separatist move came from a 
nation-state that has worked hard to promote European unionization, whose 
economy has been trapped, in many respects. Unable to integrate further by 
joining the monetary union, it has not delivered the appropriate economic 
growth and development results that would fulfi ll the expectations of its citizens 
over the decades of its own integration choices. The dilemmas posed for the UK 
economy, its diffi cult position before the vote for Brexit, the specifi c pressure 
exercised upon it (for example through enhanced immigration from English-
speaking Europeans and non-European after the discrete fall of most barriers in 
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the movement inside the EU that was never acknowledged by the EU as a unique 
problem), could make the rest of European states willing to offer the UK another 
opportunity to rejoin the EU, in the near future. Besides, the permanent loss of 
membership is not a path compatible with the common future of EU nations that 
would lead the EU at a new, successful stage of integration. 
The EU nation-states should better emulate and participate in the common 
family of nation-states on equal terms, within a spirit of co-operation and 
competition. Instead of pursuing a model of rivalry among national economies 
and national businesses, more association and collaboration among EU interests 
is needed. Large-scale investments through common supply-side policies, 
organizing long-lasting European projects and the coalition of European 
businesses is needed to forge European interests and unite the Europeans 
further.  Such common currency projects should relate to the future of the 
EU, the needs of European markets and those of Greece and other Southern 
economies. For example, in Greece they could relate to the promotion of 
aerospace engineering and industry, offering the construction of specifi c types 
of airplanes, such as hydroplanes that are now promoted in domestic fl ights or 
new type of airplanes such as silent aircrafts, and the development of whole new 
industries that would reduce the cyclical activity of the Greek economy and its 
strong dependence on tourism, such as on-line work or 3D printing. The launch 
of new products and new materials, with peculiar qualities, already tested and 
produced in scientifi c laboratories is another direction to follow. Similarly, the 
investigation and exploration of physical geographical spaces and their uses, 
the use of new geographical technology (such as G.I.S. or other applications) 
and its introduction both in production and in the protection of ecosystems and 
natural resources could help taking a path at the Greek economy towards a more 
eco-friendly, sustainable model of growth that would manage to protect natural 
resources from climate change and explore their use, preserve human and 
historical geographies, and create new jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
At the aftermath of two consecutive crises, instead of pushing towards 
further monetary and fi scal unifi cation, substantial new solutions have to be 
provided in those states suffering mostly from the ineffi cacy of past monetary 
and current fi scal restrictive policy that have acted against their convergence. 
Since economic development has been acknowledged to arrive in stages in less 
advanced states (in Rostowian or other stages), a new development stage has to 
be advanced in such states, which will inaugurate a new era for the European 
unifi cation, provided that their administration can cope with it. 
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REGION & PERIPHERY [69]
Notes 
1. A debate can be held whether Greece, a part of the Eurozone is or was found at a liquidity 
trap and what kind of liquidity trap, based on more contemporary views in economic theory.
2. It is worth noting that the IS-LM model has received strong critic and was relatively recently 
left behind in most macroeconomic analyses. This is despite its value and use for decades in 
analysing policies, which has contributed at a great expansion of wealth, income and money 
both in domestic environments and globally and helped to reduce macroeconomic imbalances.
3. This fi gure is found if the 2011-2015 change for France is divided by the number of years.
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